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Abstract
While the importance of institutions for explaining cross-country income di￿erences is widely rec-
ognized, comparatively little is known about the origins of economic institutions. One strand of the
literature emphasizes cultural di￿erences while another points at exogenous environmental factors such
as mortality and climate. Both are supported by some empirical evidence. I reconcile the two schools of
institutional origins by proposing a theory of self-selection of colonists to di￿erent geographic destina-
tions. Exogenous characteristics such as climate, mortality and factor di￿erences determine which type
of settler decides to move to a particular colony. Settler type, in turn, shapes the institutional quality of
the new country. The model is used to con￿rm observed regularities reported by previous researchers.
Furthermore, robust new evidence is presented in support of this selection process. The results suggest
that any theory of colonial development that does not take selection into account will be incomplete.
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11 Theories of Institutions
Institutions are arguably the key factor behind economic development, more important than geographical
location or trade, for example (North 1990, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Hall and Jones 1999, Rodrik et al.
2004). However, despite their signi￿cance having been recognized, there is little consensus about the origin
of economic institutions.
Various explanations have been put forth regarding the origins of wealth inducing institutions. Institu-
tions can be the result of the norms and accepted rules of behavior. Alternatively, di￿erences in institutional
outcomes among countries might be derived from political struggles over the distribution of resources. Vari-
ations in institutions can be seen as evolving from values and shared principles or could, in contrast, be the
result of an "engineering process" trying to achieve goals such as e￿ciency or wealth and power for dominant
groups. Alternative explanations are more or less suited to capture di￿erent historical circumstances, and
di￿erent institutional shaping mechanisms can, of course, act at the same time. The problem of the origins
of institutions is not only interesting in itself, it is also relevant for the literature that studies economic
growth and institutions. Competing institutional theories can explain the same empirical patterns, thereby
making identi￿cation di￿cult. Moreover, the lack of an elaborate theory of institutions might lead to a
misinterpretation of the data.
This paper will distinguish between two schools of thought on institutional origins, particularly in the
case of divergent paths in colonized countries. One school points at the role of what can broadly be de￿ned
as culture in explaining cross-country di￿erences in institutional set-ups. Hall and Jones (1999) use the
extent of European in￿uence as an instrument for institutions. La Porta et al. (1998) study the legal system
and its impact on a series of economic outcomes.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) propose an alternative theory of institutional development.
They argue that exogenous characteristics, such as settler mortality or population density, determined the
type of institutions that were established by the Europeans. In territories favorable to long-term settlement,
the Europeans created institutions favoring property rights and contracts enforcement. In places where
sizable rents could be exploited or long-term settlement was very costly, the elites instead instituted extractive
institutions. The latter type of institutions proved less conductive to long-term economic development.
Acemoglu et al.’s theory is appealing and has considerable explanatory power. Glaeser et al. (2004) question
some aspects of this theory and the importance of institutions themselves. Human capital might be more
important than settlers’ mortality in explaining economic growth. They also point out how low mortality is
associated with a high level of human capital and call for a more comprehensive approach.
So far, the literature has identi￿ed various empirical regularities: the association between settlers’ mor-
tality and economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001); the importance of human capital and the correlation
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in￿uence and development (Hall and Jones, 1999). The latter does not examines possibile di￿erences among
Europeans. I suggest a theory of colonial institutions that reconciles these empirical patterns and is sup-
ported by new evidence. Institutions are strongly related to individual and social norms. Institutions,
especially informal ones, are embedded in human preferences and cognitive models. Each person has a set
of beliefs on how to behave in a society and what to expect from other people. These principles and values
strongly in￿uence formal institutions. In the case of colonial institutions, the norms and values of the ￿rst
settlers, i.e. the institutions-setting colonists, are very important.
I propose a theory of self-selection of settlers. People are heterogeneous in their preferences over insti-
tutions; for example, some emphasize individual responsibility and self-reliance, others believe in solidarity
and the importance of a superior authority. Distinct settlers went to di￿erent territories and variation in
their preferences over institutions (culture) explains cross-country institutional di￿erences. Mortality and
other exogenous geographical characteristics determined the type of colonists that would settle in any given
territory. Each type of settler then established institutions that re￿ected its preferences.
Once established, these institutions in￿uenced the economic fortunes of the colonies. I present robust
empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. There are clear patterns in the data that associate certain
cultural types (British, Protestant, Common Law countries) with low mortality territories. The theory
proposed in this article explains why British/Protestant territories are those with better institutions and
better economic outcomes, both now and in colonial times, why low mortality is associated with better
economic outcomes, why high human capital is associated with low mortality and why European in￿uence is
associated with better outcomes and low mortality. I argue that there are underlying cultural factors, only
partially captured by our measures of institutions and culture, that are driving all these results.
Moreover, this theory does not only explain the origins of colonial institutions but also their persistence,
something that was left unexplained by Acemoglu et al. (2001): institutions are part of the cultural heritage
of a nation, hence they are transmitted from one generation to the next, especially when successful.
Before presenting the theory and the empirical evidence in more detail, previous literature will be dis-
cussed in the next section. Section three illustrates the model guiding the analysis of the data and section four
will discuss the data and the empirical strategy. The ￿fth section will show the results of our investigation
and section six will conclude the paper.
2 Institutions and Growth
There is a vast literature that studies the e￿ect of institutions on economic development. A central idea,
going back at least to North and Thomas (1973), is that good institutions, particularly those protecting
property rights, stimulate economic growth by aligning individual and societal welfare. Individuals are far
more likely to engage in productive behavior and accumulate physical or human capital if their investments
3are protected. Over time, economists have used di￿erent ways of measuring the degree of property rights
protection. This does not only include the existence of formal and informal rules against expropriation. The
actual implementation of any given set of rules must also be taken into account. This is why, in addition to
the \risk of expropriation", (La Porta et al. 2002) economists used measures such as corruption indicators
and the possibility for protection against the violation of individual rights (Mauro 1995). Rule of law is often
used as a proxy for institutional quality (Hall and Jones 1999).
Naturally, the choice of the relevant variable depends on the question we wish to investigate. When
studying the e￿ect of institutions on the performance of former communist countries, corruption is of par-
ticular importance (Sonin 2003, Johnson et al. 2002). In the description of the English Civil War and the
Glorious Revolution, measures of rule of law and expropriation risk are of larger interest (North and Weingast
1989). Most of these attempts are criticized on basis of possible endogeneity. Besides obvious measurement
problems, di￿erent theoretical arguments do not only justify the positive impact of institutions on economic
development but also the positive impact of economic growth on institutions. As people become richer they
might require more appropriate institutions. It is also possible that good institutions and economic growth
are driven by the same underlying factors, such as human capital. In these cases, identifying the causal
relationship can be complicated. Economists have tried to overcome these di￿culties through the use of
instrumental variables. I will brie￿y describe the most successful instrumental strategies since this paper
builds on them.
Hall and Jones (1999) present a model where di￿erent \social infrastructure(s)" explain cross-country
disparities in productivity. Using a broad de￿nition of institutions that includes government policies in
addition to rules, norms and political organization, they obtain the result that better institutions have a
positive e￿ect on growth. Their instruments are meant to capture the in￿uence of European culture on
the country considered (assuming that European culture had a positive e￿ect on local institutions). Those
instruments include geographical distance from the equator, as Europeans were more likely to settle in
regions far from the equator, and the percentage of the population speaking a European language as their
￿rst language. There is some room for criticizing these instruments. Geography may a￿ect growth through
di￿erent channels, for example climate and distance (even if more recent articles have found that this e￿ect
is, if anything, weak) and the fraction of the population speaking a European language may at least be
partially endogenous. Europeans might have tended to go to more successful countries or residents of more
successful countries might be more likely to learn European languages.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) de￿ne \good institutions" as those protecting private property and reducing
the risk of government expropriation. Their theory is that Europeans established di￿erent institutions in
di￿erent colonies depending on the mortality rate they faced. Wherever the risk of death was high and it was
very costly to settle in large numbers, the Europeans established extractive institutions, i.e. institutions that
did not guarantee property rights. However, they established good institutions anywhere the epidemiological
4environment favored permanent settlement. In another article, the same authors (Acemoglu et al., 2002)
complete the picture by adding the density of native population and the abundance of natural resources.
These factors determined whether the territory could be exploited for large rent extraction. In this case, the
Europeans preferred to set up institutions that did not guarantee property rights.
Rodrik et al. (2004) jointly considered geography, trade and institutions as main determinants of economic
growth. They instrument institutions using Acemoglu et al.’s approach and trade through the variables
proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999). In their words, \these two instruments, having passed what might
be called the American Economic Review (AER)-test, are our best hope at the moment of unraveling the
tangle of cause and e￿ect relationship involved". Their conclusion is that \institutions trump geography and
openness".
A literature beginning with La Porta et al. (1997) emphasizes the importance of legal origins (Common
Law versus Civil Law) as determinants of later economic success. Di￿erences in legal origins translate
into substantive di￿erences in policy and economic outcomes (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), in particular
￿nancial development and greater judicial independence (La Porta et al. 2004). These indicators are, in
turn, associated with better contract enforcement and greater security of property rights. La Porta et al.
(2007) summarize a decade long investigation along these lines and report the main ￿ndings: common law
is associated with improved ￿nancial development, better access to ￿nance, less government ownership and
regulation which, in turn, are associated with less corruption, more well-functioning labor markets and
smaller black markets. Common law countries also exhibit a more independent and less formalized judicial
system which implies more secure property rights and better contract enforcement.
Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest human capital to be the core driving force of economic growth. Partly
criticizing Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), they argue that the settlers did not only bring with them their
institutions (i.e. constraints on the executive) but also factors such as human capital. The empirical evidence
presented in their paper supports this claim. There is a strong correlation between economic growth and
human capital (measured as years of schooling) both now and in the year 1900 and human capital also has a
strong correlation with settlers’ mortality. The authors suggest that a more comprehensive approach is called
for. The idea that settlers did not only bring constraints on the executive power but also human capital
and perhaps social norms is particularly interesting. However, Glaeser et al. (2004) have not answered the
question of why mortality has such a strong correlation with measures of human capital. Furthermore, they
do not explain why British colonies appear to have systematically outperformed French and Spanish ones.
Nor is it su￿ciently clear what the settlers brought in addition to human (and, of course, physical) capital.
This paper reconciles the insights of Glaeser et al. (2004) with those of Acemoglu et al. (2001). In
the next section, I will propose a theory that brings together these di￿erent pieces of evidence under a
new interpretation, which hopefully contributes to a better understanding of the colonization process and
5the ultimate causes of economic growth. I will also present empirical evidence suggesting that underlying
cultural characteristics might be driving the results discussed above.
3 The Settlement Choice
This article builds on the following three propositions: (i) institutions, both formal and informal, explain
long-run di￿erences in cross-country economic performances; (ii) the colonial experience can be considered as
a quasi natural experiment for studying the origins of political institutions; (iii) culture played an important
role in co-determining colonization choice and subsequent institutional development. Previous researchers
have emphasized factors such as mortality, geography and human capital that prima facie may seem unrelated
to culture. I will demonstrate that these seemingly exogenous variables are, in fact, systematically related
to culture through the mechanism of endogenous choice of settlement. This suggests a more comprehensive
framework for the results obtained by other researchers and provides a new interpretation for other empirical
regularities.
What then is culture? Bednar and Page (2006a) suggest that \Culture can be de￿ned as individual
and community level behavioral patterns that depend upon context and are often suboptimal. Cultural
behavior in￿uences the performance of institutions [...] the e￿cacy of markets, democracies, and law hinges
upon behavior, particularly the tendency for people to cooperate with and trust one another. A theory of
institutions, therefore, must come to grips with culture." According to this de￿nition, culture does not only
in￿uence the rise and persistence of formal institutions but also a￿ects the performance of society given any
set of institutions. One aspect needs to be clari￿ed. The word institutions is usually used to refer to formal
institutions, i.e. a set of formalized rules that regulates the life of a community. It is useful to distinguish
between these and informal institutions. As opposed to formal institutions, informal institutions are closely
related to culture and social norms and moral principles that in￿uence individual preferences and behavior.
The idea that culture or social norms might in￿uence institutions and hence, economic outcomes, is
not new. In particular, since Weber and his \The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (Weber,
1930), the idea that protestant culture was conducive to formal and informal institutions that are bene￿cial
for growth has been widely discussed. Not only economists but also political scientists, sociologists and
historians have presented arguments and evidence in favor of or against it. Recently, Huntington (2004) and
Fogel (2000) have referred to America’s exceptional puritan cultural background to explain its development
and success. Some of the growth literature previously discussed explicitly recognizes the importance of
culture. Hall and Jones (1999) associate good institutions with European in￿uence, even though they do not
distinguish among Europeans. The theory of legal origins distinguishes between legal systems, one relevant
cultural dimension, and uses these di￿erences to explain various economic outcomes. The theory proposed
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that underlying cultural elements in￿uence various institutional and economic outcomes. The apparent
contradiction between the results of Acemoglu et al. and other works can be reconciled by recognizing the
in￿uence of cultural elements in both works, as suggested by the rest of this article.
Acemoglu and his coauthors attribute di￿erences in institutional arrangements across colonies to variation
in mortality rates: higher settler mortality is associated with lower institutional quality. Lacking any interest
in settling down in territories with unfavorable conditions, the Europeans chose to establish institutions not
leading to economic growth. However, there is another mechanism that could explain the same pattern in
the data but is based on a somewhat di￿erent theory. This mechanism is best seen not as opposite to the one
proposed by Acemoglu et al. but as complementary. The idea is that di￿erent settlers chose to migrate to
di￿erent colonies, based on exogenous attributes of the destinations. The Europeans did not randomly end up
in one colony or another; they selected their destinations beforehand. This selection process co-determined
the types of settlers that ended up in various colonies and their subsequent institutional development. Thus,
British settlers planning long-term non-expropriating economic policies did not end up in colonies suitable
for this purpose, such as North America and Australia, by chance. Conversely, Spanish settlers looking
for short-term pro￿t based on mining and exploitation did not contest or seek out sparsely populated New
England but headed for mining colonies in the Andes and plantation economies in Central America.
This idea explicitly accounts for heterogeneity across settlers or European countries. The implicit as-
sumption behind the theory that institutions were mainly established based on settlers’ survival probability
is cultural or preference homogeneity. It is thus assumed that Europeans were similar in terms of prefer-
ences, ideology and national-social values. It also assumed that di￿erent countries employed similar colonial
policies, implicitly assuming that only the exogenous attributes of the colonies were di￿erent and that these
di￿erences were allocated in a lottery-like process. Rather than being homogeneous, Europeans varied sig-
ni￿cantly in terms of culture and national policies. Englishmen were not only endowed with a di￿erent set
of values as compared to Spanish or French colonists, England also employed di￿erent colonial policies than
the continental powers. It is important to notice that this theory does not claim that settlers were homoge-
nous within a country or that each European nation followed only one colonial policy. Some British settlers
moved to the Caribbean Island and created plantations similar to those run by their Spanish counterparts.
French colonists moved to Canada and built a prosperous community before becoming part of the British
Commonwealth. The idea is that certain groups were more prominent in certain European nations rather
than others (or maybe more politically important) and that these di￿erences had important impacts on
European colonization ventures as described above.
This theory about the origins of colonial institutions reconciles the intuition of Glaeser et al. (2004) that
settlers brought with them more than formal institutions (hence, the relation between human capital and
settlers’ mortality as described in their article) with the empirical regularities discovered by Acemoglu et al.
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￿nd that, rather than being a completely exogenous instrument, mortality is a function of colonial origin.
Similarly, human capital is con￿rmed to be a source of growth, but once more, I found that human capital
itself is determined by colonial origin. The idea is not to replace exogenous factors or human capital with
colonial origin, rather the data points to a process of co-determination. These ￿ndings point to the need
for expanding the theory of colonial institutions and growth to encompass colonial origins. Before making a
careful description of these empirical patterns, I will turn to a theoretical discussion.
3.1 The Origins of Colonial Institutions
It is possible to identify at least three mechanisms explaining the origins of colonial institutions. A ￿rst
simple possibility is that the Europeans adopted the "native" institutional framework, usually extractive
institutions; they became the new masters. It could be argued, though, that native populations responded
to the same incentives as described above regarding survival probability or population density: the natives
created "bad" institutions in territories with high mortality or where remarkable rents could be extracted.
This would explain why regions like Peru or Mexico e￿ectively had extractive institutions before the arrival
of the Europeans. However, this fails to explain the situation in North America. Why did native Americans
living in territories with abundant land, scarce labor and low mortality not establish the same \property
rights institutions" that the Europeans were going to set up? The reason is straightforward. First, advanced
property rights institutions had not yet been developed by the native cultures, including the most advanced
of these nations such as Inca, Maya and Iroquois. Second, the colonizers (per de￿nition) took political power
and determined their preferred institutions. This raises the question: if sizable di￿erences existed between
Europeans and natives in terms of institutional development, is it possible that smaller, but still important,
dissimilarities existed among Europeans?
The second mechanism is outlined by Acemoglu et al. (2001) who indeed attribute the origins of colonial
institutions to European settlers. Under favorable conditions, they established "good" institutions. However,
when permanent settlement was costly, more extractive institutions were preferred. As previously argued,
my empirical ￿ndings suggest that this theory { while capturing important aspects of history { should be
complemented with a selection model of settlers. Settlers were rather heterogeneous in their individual and
social characteristic and chose di￿erent territories to migrate to. The same heterogeneity led to di￿erent
colonial policies. The theory of Acemoglu et al. (2001) with mortality and other exogenous variables as
the main determinants of colonial institutions is arguably the most widely accepted for explaining colonial
institutions (Rodrik et al. 2004). It should be emphasized that the theory proposed in this article and the
empirical ￿ndings do not invalidate this mechanism. Rather they supplement it by extending the process one
step backward; even when controling for colonial institutions mortality remains a signi￿cant albeit weaker
factor.
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values and norms gravitated toward di￿erent overseas territories. Individuals held di￿erent views about the
extent of government intervention, the importance of religion, the emphasis on individual-responsibility and
di￿erent work ethics, for example. As an historical example, consider the di￿erences in values between puritan
small farmers in New England and Spanish landlords on the Pampas. The institutions in the colonies then
mirrored the values and views of the initial immigrants, i.e. the norm-setting settlers (Huntington, 2004).
The Europeans conquered "virgin" territories and imposed their norms and rules on local populations. Thus,
they wrote their own Rousseauian contract (Rousseau, 1762), making each colonial enterprise unique.
Exogenous, geographical characteristics, such as mortality or population density, in￿uence institutions by
selecting the type of settler most likely to colonize a given region. Settlers’ mortality and population density
or urbanization should correlate with di￿erent types of settlers. Moreover, if settlers’ types are correlated
with national or religious identity, mortality will in￿uence the likelihood of being colonized by a certain
European country (religious type). The next few sections of this article will suggest this to indeed be the
case.
Colonial institutions were also in￿uenced by the home country. The home country could in￿uence overseas
institutions by regulating the ￿ow of migrants, thereby in￿uencing the type and the number of settlers
migrating, or through laws and regulations. Many factors obviously in￿uenced colonial policies, for example
national culture and national institutions, e.g. how powerful the king was, political equilibria and the
structure of the economy, e.g. the importance of the mercantile class. These factors in￿uenced the choices
of the European countries in terms of which territories to colonize. They also in￿uenced the colonial policies
adopted toward overseas provinces. A clear example is given by the liberal emigration and land grants
policies adopted by England versus the relatively more restrictive policy adopted by Spain.
Engerman and Sokolo￿ (2000) describe Spanish colonization as follows. \Spanish authorities adopted the
approach of distributing enormous grants of land, often including claims to a stream of income from the native
labor residing in the vicinity, and of mineral resources among a privileged few". Spanish colonization policy
was centralized and encouraged Spanish colonists to go wherever there were large rents to be extracted. They
continue: \Spain focused its attention on [...] colonies such as Mexico and Peru, whose factor endowments
were characterized by rich mineral resources and by substantial numbers of natives surviving contact with
Europeans colonizers"; Spain applied \restrictive immigration policies [...] to her colonies". It seems that
Spanish colonists and government chose the overseas territories that were most pro￿table for establishing
extractive institutions. Engerman and Sokolo￿ continue: \the contrast between the United States and
Canada, with their practices of o￿ering small units of land for disposal and maintaining open immigration,
and the rest of the Americas, where land and labor policies led to large landholdings and great inequality,
seems to extend across a wide spectrum of institutions and other government interventions".
Similarly, Veliz (1994) analyzes the di￿erences between Latin America and British America at length. He
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di￿erences between Spain and England. Such deep di￿erences between the two super-powers of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, in the author’s words, are summarized by their two great cultural achievements,
the Industrial Revolution and the Counter-Reformation. While England promoted and embraced a change
that was bound to have an overwhelming impact on Europe and the rest of the world, Spain’s greatest
achievement was a movement toward the restoration of the old order. The British brought to America a
stubborn ability to thrive on diversity and change that was entirely consistent with their entrepreneurial and
mercantilist culture. The Iberians, in contrast, brought a cultural tradition shaped like a vast baroque dome,
a monument to their successful attempt at arresting the changes that threatened their imperial moment.
To emphasize the importance of the origins of colonists, consider that much of the southern part of
Latin America resembles United States and southern Canada in terms of abundance of land and climate.
Similarly, there are few intrinsic di￿erences between northern Mexico and the south-western parts of the
United States. Despite this, the institutions are clearly very di￿erent in these examples. It would appear
that deeper causes, such as colonial policies or settler type, must be taken into account to explain the
institutional divergence between North and South America. The restrictive immigration policies embraced
by the Spanish crown constitute an example of limits imposed on the type of Spanish settler that was willing
to immigrate to the New World in order to create new wealth through work and entrepreneurship. The
Spanish crown simultaneously encouraged emigrants who planned to exploit local resources and populations.
Similar policies and emigration patterns applied to Africa and Asia.
It is a clich￿ e but nevertheless true and informative that long-term productive settlers, such as the Puritans,
were far more common in England than in contemporary Spain, France or Portugal.
3.2 Mortality, Culture and Institutions
The theory described above ties together pieces of evidence from di￿erent sources. Variation in mortality
levels seems to be systematically related to di￿erences in economic outcomes. Other evidence links variations
in institutional quality and economic outcomes to human capital (Glaeser et al. 2004). In addition, there is
a well established literature on the importance of culture and social norms (Guiso et al., 2003). Even though
these concepts are hard to capture and measure in a stringent way, norms and values are important economic
variables (Guiso et al., 2007). In addition to direct in￿uence on economic behavior, it seems plausible that
cultural variables play a part in both institutions and the accumulation of human capital.
The theory proposed in this article is thus that exogenous variables such as mortality determined the
type of settlers drawn to various territories. The settler type, in turn, in￿uenced institutions and the
accumulation of human capital. Economic outcome was a function of formal institutions (determined by
settler type and exogenous characteristics), informal institutions such as culture and norms (determined by
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two strands of the previous literature while doing a better job at explaining the data. While previous
literature presented extensive evidence regarding the relationship among culture, institutions, human capital
and economic outcomes, there is little or no evidence of the relation between mortality, other geographical
characteristics and cultural types. I will ￿rst focus on this last piece of empirical regularity and then
discuss the relationship between culture and institutions. Colonialism is an almost ideal quasi-experiment
for studying the impact of culture on institutions and economic outcomes. The next section will show that the
anecdotal observation that the more successful colonies are also those with an British colonial background,
is supported by a more sophisticated data analysis. Institutions, especially informal institutions, the non-
written rules of behavior and social norms, are embedded in individual preference functions (Becker and
Murphy, 2000). These can change over time, under the pressure of technological change or broader social
forces, but are taken as given by individuals in the short and medium term, often for their entire life.
As in Acemoglu et al. (2001), institutions are persistent over time and institutions established in colonial
periods survived until modern times, with minor changes. The reason for this persistence is clear: formal
and informal institutions are part of the cultural heritage of a group; they re￿ect deeper beliefs about the
existence of the community. Institutions are transmitted from generation to generation as part of the shared
views of society; they help de￿ne the identity of individuals and improve the workings of a society, decreasing
the information and transaction costs.
This article investigates how the probability of colonization of a country with certain geographical con-
ditions is in￿uenced by the cultural characteristics of settlers. While it is hard to measure culture or social
norms today, it is yet harder to ￿nd suitable proxies going back to colonial times. Ideally, we would like
to observe individual characteristics of colonists, measures of their social values, their individual norms and
perhaps also their political ideology. No such detailed data are available for that period. Instead, I will
rely on nationality and religion as imperfect measurements of settler type (Weber 1930, Huntington 2004).
Religious and civil norms are, per de￿nition, strongly ingrained in a person’s mind and in￿uence private and
public actions. Moreover, they are stable over time and only change gradually. I will also use other variables
proposed by La Porta and his coauthors, namely the type of legal system existing in the colonies. While
the literature on legal origins is focused on evaluating the independent contribution of the legal system to
economic development, here they will be used as proxies of culture. Ideally, we would like to have measures
of human capital which would allow us to evaluate whether settlers with di￿erent human capital chose to go
to di￿erent colonies. Glaeser et al. (2004) provide some measures for human capital whose usefulness will
be discussed later.
There are advantages and disadvantages in using national or religious proxies for culture. The main
disadvantage is that, to some degree, the cultural aspects that are conducive to good institutions and
economic growth remain hidden. If we could observe individual characteristics, we could discriminate among
11settlers with views favoring property rights and contracts enforcement and settlers with other fundamental
beliefs. National culture heritage will instead only be suggestive of a certain type of settler and culture
(Weber, 1930; Huntington, 2004). The national identity dummies will, in fact, represent the fact that some
countries were more likely to send a certain type of settlers rather than sending them with probability one.
Clearly, not all Protestant settlers ￿t the ideal description given by Weber in terms of social norms and work
ethics. However, it is reasonable to assume that they ￿t this description better than non-Protestants.
The main advantage of using national dummies for culture is that they are likely to capture both individual
and political di￿erences in colonial type as previously described. It should be kept in mind that national
types will not allow us to separate the impact of state policies and the di￿erences in the immigrants’ culture.
An historical example would be how a colony settled by protestant French Huguenots in a geographically
fertile and low mortality region would have compared to Haiti or a French African colony. No such historical
experiment exists.
4 Data and Speci￿cations
We can represent the settlers’ (or countries’) choice following the standard theory of discrete regression
models (Maddala, 1983). Let us consider an underlying response variable, y￿




0xi + ui: (1)
The variable y￿
i measures the net utility of colonizing a territory, vector xi contains the exogenous character-
istics that explain the colonization choice (mortality, latitude, average temperature, population density etc)
and ui is an error term. In practice, the variable y￿
i is unobservable. Instead, we observe a dummy variable,
yi, de￿ned by
yi = 1 if y￿
i ￿ 0 (2)
yi = 0 if y￿
i < 0:
The probability of the dummy variable being equal to one, i.e. of a given territory being colonized by a
certain type of settler, is given by:
Pr(yi = 1j xi) = Pr(ui > ￿￿
0xi) = 1 ￿ F(￿￿
0xi); (3)
where F is the cumulative distribution function for u. I estimate this probability using probit and logit mod-
els, the only di￿erence being the assumed density function for the errors. Since the results are qualitatively
the same, I will only report the results from the probit analysis.1
1The results are obtained by a probit model. The logit speci￿cation is not reported because it delivers the same results,
but it is available on request. Amemiya (1981) suggests that multiplying the logit estimates by 1=16 = 0:625 produces a close
approximation between the two models and makes the coe￿cients comparable.
12The dependent variables are dummy variables classifying the European States into Protestant versus
Catholic, or Common Law versus Civil Law. Moreover, there are dummies representing the nationality of
each colony’s home country. Only England, Spain and France had enough colonies to be analyzed separately,
and Spain barely so. I run a separate probit regression for each of them. The independent variables are
mortality, urbanization, population density, latitude and natural resources. Due to lack of data, a complete
probit analysis of choices using human capital as the independent variable could not be performed. However
there is some evidence that there might be a similar ongoing process.
The data are the same as those used in previous works. The mortality data, national and religious
dummies and various other control variables, such as latitude, urbanization, populations density and natural
resources, are taken from Acemoglu et al. (2001). The human capital measures and di￿erent institutional
proxies are taken from Glaeser et al. (2004). The dummies for legal systems are constructed following La
Porta et al. (2007). A description of the variables used is given in the Appendix.
4.1 Other Speci￿cations
Running a probit regression separately for England, Spain and France is based on the assumption that the
policies of these three countries are independent of each other in terms of colonization outcomes. To some
extent, this is a reasonable assumption since there are only three major countries that have successfully
carried out colonial expansions.2 Robustness checks are performed on the assumption of independence. It
is possible that the policy of each country had some in￿uence on the choices of the others. For example,
once one territory was colonized by one country, the other European kingdoms had no access to that land
unless they started a war against the initial colonizers. The choices depended on other factors, such as
relative military strength and maritime resources. One way of taking this interdependence into account
is to run a multinomial logit regression. The multinomial model treats the choices of the three countries
as interdependent. Instead of having three separate regression for the three countries, I only perform one
regression whose dependent variable is not a dummy variable, but a variable that takes on three values (0,1
and 2), one for each country. The multinomial logit jointly calculates the probability of each realization.
A second way of controling for possible interdependence is the division of the original sample into sub-
samples based on the colonization period. For each territory, the colonization date can be found in historical
records. I used the on-line version of Encyclopaedia Britannica and consider the date in which any European
country established a permanent outpost in the relevant area as the colonization date. I constructed three
2Netherlands and Portugal are the two main other colonial nations in the period discussed. Russia was in some sense so
successful that the colonial episode is indistinguishable from a simple expansion of national boundaries. Smaller European
nations such as Sweden and Denmark failed to establish any major colonies. Germany, Italy and Belgium did establish colonies,
but much later than what is commonly assumed. This colonial period only lasted a little more than half a century. All these
countries are included in the sample.
13subsamples. The ￿rst subsample contains all territories that were colonized before or in 1896. The 1896
date represents the 85% percentile of the colonizations dates. The second subsample contains the territories
colonized between 1530 (the 10th percentile) and 1898 (the 90th percentile). The third subsample contains
all territories colonized after 1533 (15th percentile). I then run the probit and logit models described above
on the three subsamples. This division into smaller periods of time is meant to capture that at any given
point in time, not all possible countries were available for colonization either because some of them still
remained to be discovered or because somebody already occupied them.
The results may, in principle, be sensible to the choices of dates but, in practice, this does not seem to
be the case. The main problem is clearly the small size of the sample. This imposes some limitations on this
type of exercise, such as the number of subsamples that can be considered.
5 Mortality, Culture and Institutions
5.1 Mortality and Culture
Tables 1 and 2 report the coe￿cient and the marginal e￿ects estimated for Protestants. Note that since
Catholic colonies are those that are not Protestant, the results (not reported) are the same but with the
reverse sign. Tables 3 and 4 report the same for Common Law colonies while the same applies for Civil Law
colonies as for Catholic colonies. Tables 5 to 10 concern England, France and Spain. The ￿rst speci￿cation
only considers mortality as an exogenous factor that explains the colonization choice. From the second
speci￿cation I add various controls, such as demographic and geographical variables. Usually, they do not
have any impact on the signi￿cance of the coe￿cient of mortality except in the case of Spain. These results
can be explained by the smaller number of Spanish colonies and their geographical concentration in territories
with homogeneous mortality levels.
Mortality explains the choice of Europeans countries overseas. British/Protestant/Common Law colonies
generally became established in territories with low mortality. This suggests that British/Protestant settlers
were likely to colonize places with favorable conditions for long-term settlements. French/Catholics settlers
do exactly the opposite, pursuing a colonization policy that seems purely extractive. The coe￿cient on
mortality is not always signi￿cant for Spain. When signi￿cant, it indicates that Spain or Spanish settlers
were more likely to behave as their French Catholic counterparts. Controling for population density and
rate of urbanization, the coe￿cient on mortality for Spain becomes signi￿cant and positive which suggests
that given the level of native population, which represents an exploitable rent, the Spanish Crown was more
likely to go to places with higher mortality.
Figures 1-7 show the probabilities, according to the di￿erent speci￿cations, of being colonized by Protes-
tants/Catholics or Common Law/Civil Law countries, respectively, and England, France and Spain as a
function of settlers’ mortality. The graphs evidentiate di￿erent colonization patterns for di￿erent religious,
14national or legal types. The evidence is in favor of a selection theory of colonization. Di￿erent countries and
di￿erent settlers colonized di￿erent territories. Their di￿erences are probably re￿ected in the institutions
they established across their colonies. Let us look at the stark di￿erences between England and France. We
might consider the two opposite colonization patterns as an accident of history but it is more reasonable to
think that values, social norms, culture and speci￿c policies have led the two European countries to di￿er so
sharply in their colonization preferences.
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Time Subsamples
The division of the four centuries of colonization into smaller time periods allows us to account for the
interdependence of colonization choices. As time passed, new territories became available for colonization,
more lands were discovered and some were already occupied by someone else raising the cost of colonization.
Given the small size of the subsamples, I ignored the di￿erence between England, France and Spain and
focused on the dichotomies Protestant versus Catholic and Common Law versus Civil Law. The estimated
coe￿cients, marginal e￿ects and probabilities in all subsamples support the results of the previous section.
Tables 11-22 are for Protestant and Common Law countries, coe￿cients and marginal e￿ects; Catholic and
Civil Law colonies are non-Protestant and non-Common Law colonies, respectively, so the results are the
same but with the reverse sign. The previous result, i.e. Protestant/Common Law States colonize territories
with lower mortality and Catholic/Civil Law countries do the opposite, also holds in the subsamples.
5.2.2 Multinomial Logit
The multinomial logit model takes into account the interdependence of the colonization choices. Rather than
assuming the colonization choices of the di￿erent European countries to have been made independently, as
is implicitly assumed by running separate regressions for each country, the multinomial model treats British,
French and Spanish choices as in￿uencing each another. The results presented in Tables3 23 and 24 generally
con￿rm the ￿ndings from the probit analysis: England tends to colonize low mortality countries, while France
and Spain prefer territories with higher mortality.
5.3 Culture and Institutions
Tables 25-32 show the systematic relationship between "good" indicators and British/Protestant background.
Besides a higher income per capita, former British colonies have higher levels of human capital and better
institutions. There are two quali￿cations that the reader should bear in mind. First, the evidence reported
does not prove causation, it merely hints at certain underlying patterns that may be of importance. Irre-
3I only present the results obtained using England as the omitted value. The results are similar when we consider Spain or
France as the omitted value.
15spective of whether one accepts that institutions or human capital are the ultimate causes of growth, the
question of why British and Protestant background was so strongly associated with good institutions, rapid
economic growth and human capital accumulation must be answered. Here, I stress the lack of good cultural
measures, especially for the colonial period, as possible explanations for the di￿culty in getting a de￿nitive
answer to this question. Unfortunately, due to their binomial nature, dummy variables are not very helpful
when it comes to explaining variation in institutions or economic performance. Naturally, other approaches
are possible but should encompass the exceptionalism of the British colonial experience.
A second quali￿cation is already stressed by Glaeser et al. (2004). They convincingly argue that certain
measures of institutions used in the literature are not proper measures of institutions, but rather indicators
of the quality of policies. An example they discuss is that of a dictator that chooses to respect property rights
rather than being bound to them by a Constitution (Singapore or USSR). This might suggest endogeneity
arising from measurement issues. This is, however, less of a problem in the context of this article; our
core propositions are not only that good norms are more likely to produce better Constitutions, but also
that good norms will deliver better policies, given any Constitution. This is something peculiar as concerns
norms. In particular, British/Protestants countries would tend to have better informal institutions, higher
human capital and better policies, given their formal institutions. If so, even a dictator living in a society
with such norms would be more likely to be a "good dictator" than a "bad dictator". British/Protestant
norms have an e￿ect both on the "extensive margin", the quality of the formal institutions and, on the
"intensive margin", the quality of the policies produced by any given set of formal institutions. In a nutshell,
for the purposes of this article, it is less relevant whether the variables measuring "institutions" actually
measure formal institutions or the combination of formal and informal institutions. The theory of this article
is that better norms deliver better Constitutions and better policies, given the Constitution. Lacking better
measures of informal institutions, this is as far as we can get.
One of the likely sources of endogeneity is the possibility of economic growth inducing better institutions
or that richer economies have better education systems and hence, higher levels of human capital. If the
British/Protestant colonies had become richer for any other reason than their institutions or human capital,
we would be drawing the wrong conclusion from Tables 25-32. Optimally, we would like to observe institutions
and human capital closer to the colonization period, possibly at the establishment of the colony. We would like
to study the early settlers. This does not only allow us to avoid the reverse causality problem discussed above
but also to test, on another dimension, whether the theory presented in this article is reasonable. In fact, it
is possible that individuals with di￿erent human capital decided to move to di￿erent colonies. Unfortunately,
we do not have enough data on settlers’ human capital, so we cannot look for systematic evidence like that
presented above. Some data are provided by Glaeser et al. (2004). From these observations, an interesting
pattern emerges in line with what has been suggested in this article about primary school enrollment and
institutions in some early colonies at the end of the nineteenth century. Enrollment in primary school seems
16to be strongly related to an British/Protestant background. Primary school enrollment in British/Protestant
countries on average seems higher than in the rest of the colonies across all our measures of enrollment. Of the
￿ve former colonies for which primary school enrollment in 1870 is available, four are British/Protestant and
all score ten times higher than the only non-English colony. Thus, the fact that for virtually all non-English
colonies we do not have any data on primary school enrollment tells us something about the level of human
capital in those countries. The lack of data is, in fact, due to the lack of a widespread educational system
rather than simple lack of collected data. Of the nine observations we have for primary school enrollment
in 1900, four are British and ￿ve Spanish. The British colonies all score above 0.872, i.e. more than 87%
of all children aged between 5 and 14 were enrolled in school, while the Spanish colonies all score below
0.324. If we look at constraints on the executive, a measure of the quality of institutions, in 1870, of the
nine observations available, the three Protestant colonies all score a seven, the highest grade indicating a
greater extent of institutionalized constraints on the power of chief executives, while the remaining Catholic
ones score one three and ￿ve ones; one being the lowest grade indicating unlimited executive authority.
Repeating the same exercise for the year 1900, we see that the four Protestant colonies all score a seven
while the remaining Catholic ones have an average of 4.84.
This evidence suggests that the British/Protestant former colonies do not only have a higher level of
human capital/better institutions today, but seem to outperform other colonies in this respect also in colonial
times. It seems that the same cultural features that made early British/Protestant colonies successful in
educating their population and creating better institutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries still
have a positive in￿uence on them. As said before, institutions, particularly informal ones, are part of the
cultural heritage of a people and tend to be transmitted from one generation to the next, especially when
successful (Hayek, 1991).
Once more, these are not de￿nitive answers but instead results that point at systematic relationships
between institutions and human capital and cultural background.
6 Conclusions
Economic growth and institutions have been intensely studied in the last ten to ￿fteen years (see Asoni,
2008 for a survey). Variables that have previously been associated with good institutions or good economic
outcomes seem to be systematically related to certain cultural traits. The measures of these cultural traits
are not perfect and their discrete and binomial nature limits their econometric importance vis-a-vis other
richer variables. This is a source of noise that gives raise to possible misinterpretations of the data. The
evidence proposed above suggests that the British/Protestant culture is strongly associated with low settlers’
mortality, high human capital and distance from the equator, even though this last association is statistically
insigni￿cant when controling for settlers’ mortality. Each of the three variables above has been proposed as
a source of economic growth, or as an instrument, in previous research. The Protestant/British background
17is also positively associated with di￿erent measures of good institutions, both today and one hundred years
ago. The variables that have been found to have a profound impact on institutions and economic growth
seem to be associated with each other through some deeper cultural link. This raises the question of
whether all the di￿erent variables proposed are just imperfect proxies for factors that we are not yet able to
measure adequately. Probably each single variable has an impact that is independent of the cultural traits
it represents. This should not be allowed to conceal the more comprehensive picture, however.
The above ￿ndings are in line with the idea that institutions, especially informal institutions, are deeply
embedded in people’s minds. Institutions are not the result an abstract engineering process taking place when
the colony is established; rather they are the expression of what people think about society and how it should
be organized. Once this idea has been taken into account, it is easily understood why institutions persist
over time and why similar formal institutions may perform so dissimilarly across cultural environments.
This path has been little investigated so far. The evidence presented in this article, rea￿rming the results
from the previous literature, suggests that the quest for the causes of economic growth consists of at least
three separate questions. The ￿rst regards the mechanism of economic growth, i.e. the study of those
activities that create economic growth, such as accumulation of physical and human capital, trade and
technological development and good institutions such as property rights and independent legal systems. A
great deal of time and intellectual e￿ort has already been spent on this question. The second question
is why anecdotal and systematic evidence seems to relate most of the factors that spur economic growth
to Protestantism or an British cultural background. What are the norms, the individual and collective
values characterizing the intellectual and social environment that systematically stimulate behaviors and
institutions conducive to economic success? Are they unique to Protestantism? How easily can they be
adopted by other cultures? Culture is de￿ned as a bundle of values and norms, so it is not clear whether
di￿erent values can successfully spread across cultures. The third question is whether Protestant culture and
economic growth can be separated. The evidence seems to suggest that they can indeed be separated, at
least to some extent: economic growth is now more than ever a global phenomenon not restricted to former
British colonies. There is undoubtedly much more to economic growth than Protestant culture. However,
there are two types of economic growth: growth that comes from imitating/adopting successful models or
technologies, and growth that emanates from innovation and the resulting expansion of the technological
frontier. Much of world growth is arguably driven by other countries adopting originally British technology
and institutions. Is this di￿erence important in terms of analysis? Can it be related to culture or other
factors? Is it just by chance that English-speaking people produced the First Industrial Revolution, the
Fordist Revolution and, most recently, the ICT Revolution? Or is there something unique in the institutions
created by the British? These questions naturally arise from any discussion of growth and institutions, yet
remain to be answered satisfactorily.
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Appendix
￿ Average Expropriation Risk: from Glaeser et al. (2004). Risk of "outright con￿scation and forced national-
ization" of property. This variable ranges from zero to ten, where higher values equal a lower probability
of expropriation. This variable is calculated as the average from 1982 through 1997, or for speci￿c years as
needed in the tables. Source: International Country Risk Guide at http://www.countrydata.com/datasets/.
￿ Colonial Dummies: Dummy indicating whether a country was a British, French, German, Spanish, Italian,
Belgian, Dutch or Portuguese colony. As in Acemoglu (2001), from La Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Average Temperature: as in Acemoglu (2001).
￿ Latitude: Absolute value of latitude of the country. Measure of distance from the equator scaled to take values
between 0 and 1, where 0 is the equator. As in Acemoglu (2001), from La Porta et al. (1999).
￿ Log European settler mortality: mortality rate of European settlers in the colony. From Acemoglu (2001).
￿ Years of schooling: from Glaeser et al. (2004). Years of schooling of the total population aged above 25. This
variable is constructed as the average from 1960 through 2000 or, for speci￿c years, as needed in the tables.
Source: Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and
Implications. Source: Barro and Lee (2000) Data posted on http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
￿ Constraint on Executive: from Glaeser et al. (2004). A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints
on the decision making powers of chief executives. The variable takes seven di￿erent values: (1) Unlimited
authority (there are no regular limitations on the executive’s actions, as distinct from irregular limitations
such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations); (2) Intermediate category; (3) Slight to moderate
limitation on executive authority (there are some real but limited restraints on the executive); (4) Intermediate
category; (5) Substantial limitations on executive authority (the executive has a more e￿ective authority than
any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them); (6) Intermediate category; (7)
Executive parity or subordination (accountability groups have e￿ective authority equal to or greater than the
executive in most areas of activity). This variable ranges from one to seven, where higher values equal a
greater extent of institutionalized constraints on the power of chief executives. This variable is calculated as
the average from 1960 through 2000, or for speci￿c years as needed in the tables. Source: as in Jaggers and
Marshall (2000).
￿ GDP per capita: from Glaeser et al. (2004). Gross domestic product over population. Source: Aten et
al. (2002). Data available on-line at: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (this paper uses data from the 04-06-2003
version). GDP per capita for the 1870-1950 periods comes from Maddison (2003).
22￿ Constitutional Review: from Glaeser et al. (2004). Constitutional review is computed as the sum of two
variables. The ￿rst variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or constitutional
court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes three
values: 2 { if there is full review of constitutionality of laws, 1 { if there is limited review of constitutionality
of laws, 0 { if there is no review of constitutionality of laws. The second variable measures (on a scale from 1
to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. One point each is given if the approval of
the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is necessary to change the constitution.
An additional point is given for each of the following: if a supermajority in the legislature (more than 66%
of the votes) is needed, if both houses of the legislature must approve, if the legislature must approve the
amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval of a majority of state legislature is required.
This variable is normalized from zero to one where higher values equal a higher degree of constitutional review
by the courts. This variable is measured as of 1995. Source: La Porta et al. (2004).
￿ Judicial Independence: from Glaeser et al. (2004). Judicial independence is computed as the sum of three
variables. The ￿rst variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country) and
takes a value of 2 { if tenure is lifelong, 1 { if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, and 0 { if tenure
is less than six years. The second measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative
cases and takes a value of 2 { if tenure is lifelong, 1 { if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, 0 {
if tenure is less than six years. The third variable measures the existence of case law and takes a value of 1
if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law and 0 otherwise. The variable is normalized from
zero to one where higher values equal a higher degree of judicial independence. This variable is measured as of
1995. Source: La Porta et al. (2004).
￿ Autocracy: from Glaeser et al. (2004). This variable classi￿es regimes based on their degree of autocracy.
Democracies are coded as 0, bureaucracies (dictatorships with a legislature) are coded as 1 and autocracies
(dictatorship without a legislature) are coded as 2. Transition years are coded as the regime emerging
afterwards. This variable ranges from zero to two where higher values equal a higher degree of autocracy.
This variable is measured as the average from 1960 through 1990; or for speci￿c years as needed in the tables.
Source: Alvarez et al. (2000).
￿ Primary School Enrollment: from Glaeser et al. (2004). This variable measures primary school enrollment as
a percentage of children aged 5 through 14. Measured in 1870, 1890, and 1900. Source: Lindert (2001).
23Figure 1: Predicted probability of being colonized by a protestant country for a given level of settler 
mortality 
 Figure 2: Predicted probability of being colonized by a catholic country for a given level of settler 
mortality  
 Figure 3: Predicted probability of being colonized by a common law country for a given level of settler 
mortality  
 Figure 4: Predicted probability of being colonized by a Civil Law country for a given level of settler 
mortality  
 Figure 5: Predicted probability of being colonized by England for a given level of settler mortality  
 Figure 6: Predicted probability of being colonized by France for a given level of settler mortality  
 Figure 7: Predicted probability of being colonized by Spain for a given level of settler mortality  
 
 Table 1 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a protestant country. 
Protestants: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.268  -1.461  -1.352  -1.362  -0.284  -0.413  -0.172 
  [0.133]**  [0.409]***  [0.451]***  [0.437]***  [0.149]*  [0.155]***  [0.145] 
Pop. Density    0.117    0.229       
    [0.057]**    [0.119]*       
Urbanization      -0.006  -0.159       
      [0.049]  [0.087]*       
Gold              0.069 
              [0.291] 
Iron              0.282 
              [0.427] 
Silver              -0.143 
              [0.192] 
Zinc              0.058 
              [0.313] 
Aver. Temp.            0.076   
            [0.037]**   
Latitude          -0.337     
          [1.395]     
Constant  1.101  5.113  5.319  5.265  1.237  0.036  0.582 
  [0.640]*  [1.676]***  [1.899]***  [1.788]***  [0.853]  [0.820]  [0.717] 
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  63 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.05  0.5  0.32  0.59  0.05  0.1  0.11 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 2  
Marginal effects calculated at mean level. 
Protestants: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.106  -0.583  -0.529  -0.525  -0.112  -0.163  -0.069 
  [0.053]**  [0.164]***  [0.186]***  [0.162]***  [0.059]*  [0.061]***  [0.058] 
Pop. Density    0.047    0.088       
    [0.023]**    [0.038]**       
Gold              0.027 
              [0.116] 
Iron              0.112 
              [0.171] 
Silver              -0.057 
              [0.076] 
Zinc              0.023 
              [0.125] 
Aver. Temp.            0.03   
            [0.015]**   
Latitude          -0.133     
          [0.551]     
Urbanization      -0.002  -0.062       
      [0.019]  [0.032]*       
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  63 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.05  0.5  0.32  0.59  0.05  0.1  0.11 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 3  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a common law country 
Common Law: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.276  -1.967  -1.967  -1.916  -0.273  -0.384  -0.155 
  [0.136]**  [0.676]***  [0.736]***  [0.711]***  [0.150]*  [0.155]**  [0.149] 
Pop. Density    0.007    0.013       
    [0.013]    [0.015]       
Urbanization      -0.034  -0.06       
      [0.057]  [0.067]       
Gold              0.067 
              [0.298] 
Iron              0.293 
              [0.437] 
Silver              -0.142 
              [0.199] 
Zinc              0.073 
              [0.321] 
Aver. Temp.            0.057   
            [0.037]   
Latitude          0.06     
          [1.430]     
Constant  1.001  7.558  7.863  7.674  0.978  0.204  0.333 
  [0.654]  [2.861]***  [3.138]**  [3.024]**  [0.855]  [0.829]  [0.743] 
Observations  59  36  36  36  59  59  59 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.05  0.48  0.48  0.49  0.05  0.09  0.14 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 4 
Marginal effects calculated at mean level. 
Common Law: Marginal Effects         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.106  -0.748  -0.758  -0.727  -0.105  -0.147  -0.061 
  [0.052]**  [0.293]**  [0.318]**  [0.309]**  [0.058]*  [0.060]**  [0.059] 
Pop. Density    0.002    0.005       
    [0.005]    [0.006]       
Gold              0.026 
              [0.118] 
Iron              0.115 
              [0.174] 
Silver              -0.056 
              [0.078] 
Zinc              0.029 
              [0.126] 
Aver. Temp.            0.022   
            [0.014]   
Latitude          0.023     
          [0.548]     
Urbanization      -0.013  -0.023       
      [0.022]  [0.025]       
Observations  59  36  36  36  59  59  59 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.05  0.48  0.48  0.49  0.05  0.09  0.14 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 5  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was England 
England: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.322  -2.087  -2.037  -2.336  -0.298  -0.452  -0.22 
  [0.135]**  [0.601]***  [0.739]***  [0.930]**  [0.150]**  [0.155]***  [0.147] 
Pop. Density    0.133    0.367       
    [0.062]**    [0.268]       
Urbanization      0  -0.3       
      [0.052]  [0.246]       
Gold              0.061 
              [0.291] 
Iron              0.274 
              [0.437] 
Silver              -0.148 
              [0.200] 
Zinc              0.078 
              [0.321] 
Aver. Temp.            0.07   
            [0.037]*   
Latitude          0.526     
          [1.418]     
Constant  1.223  7.391  8.023  9.048  1.014  0.227  0.668 
  [0.645]*  [2.446]***  [3.161]**  [3.843]**  [0.853]  [0.831]  [0.722] 
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  63 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.07  0.67  0.45  0.78  0.07  0.11  0.14 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 6 
Marginal effects calculated at mean level. 
England: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.124  -0.82  -0.791  -0.925  -0.115  -0.174  -0.087 
  [0.052]**  [0.253]***  [0.317]**  [0.349]***  [0.058]**  [0.060]***  [0.058] 
Pop. Density    0.052    0.145       
    [0.026]**    [0.100]       
Gold              0.024 
              [0.115] 
Iron              0.108 
              [0.173] 
Silver              -0.058 
              [0.078] 
Zinc              0.031 
              [0.126] 
Aver. Temp.            0.027   
            [0.014]*   
Latitude          0.202     
          [0.546]     
Urbanization      0  -0.119       
      [0.020]  [0.095]       
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  63 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.07  0.67  0.45  0.78  0.07  0.11  0.14 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 7  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was France 
France: Coefficients             
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  0.528  1.134  1.417  1.349  0.757  0.416  0.477 
  [0.169]***  [0.680]*  [0.825]*  [0.834]  [0.218]***  [0.179]**  [0.175]*** 
Pop. Density    0    -0.009       
    [0.017]    [0.020]       
Urbanization      0.097  0.105       
      [0.068]  [0.070]       
Aver. Temp.            0.086   
            [0.058]   
Latitude          4.073     
          [1.952]**     
Constant  -3.304  -5.918  -8  -7.699  -5.199  -4.829  -2.959 
  [0.876]***  [3.080]*  [4.007]**  [4.041]*  [1.383]***  [1.466]***  [0.915]*** 
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  53 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.17  0.15  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.2  0.13 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 8 
Marginal effects calculated at mean. 
France: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  0.146  0.189  0.147  0.145  0.194  0.108  0.152 
  [0.044]***  [0.079]**  [0.082]*  [0.078]*  [0.052]***  [0.047]**  [0.054]*** 
Pop. Density    0    -0.001       
    [0.003]    [0.002]       
Aver. Temp.            0.022   
            [0.014]   
Latitude          1.042     
          [0.473]**     
Urbanization      0.01  0.011       
      [0.008]  [0.009]       
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  53 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.17  0.15  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.2  0.13 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 9  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was Spain 
Spain: Coefficients             
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.143  1.378  0.814  2.088  -0.186  0.136  -0.255 
  [0.152]  [0.467]***  [0.370]**  [0.851]**  [0.170]  [0.183]  [0.179] 
Pop. Density    -0.534    -2.148       
    [0.233]**    [1.286]*       
Urbanization      -0.01  0.43       
      [0.044]  [0.207]**       
Aver. Temp.            -0.132   
            [0.040]*** 
Latitude          -0.867     
          [1.470]     
Constant  -0.013  -4.846  -3.515  -7.971  0.344  1.601  0.497 
  [0.702]  [1.823]***  [1.563]**  [3.219]**  [0.927]  [0.857]*  [0.840] 
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  53 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.01  0.44  0.12  0.69  0.02  0.18  0.04 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 10 
Marginal effect calculated at mean 
Spain: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.045  0.01  0.312  0  -0.059  0.04  -0.078 
  [0.048]  [0.035]  [0.137]**  [0.000]  [0.053]  [0.054]  [0.054] 
Pop. Density    -0.004    0       
    [0.012]    [0.000]       
Aver. Temp.            -0.039   
            [0.012]*** 
Latitude          -0.275     
          [0.465]     
Urbanization      -0.004  0       
      [0.017]  [0.000]       
Observations  63  38  38  38  63  63  53 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.01  0.44  0.12  0.69  0.02  0.18  0.04 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 11 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a protestant country. 
Sample restricted to the colonies colonized before 1896. 
Protestants, Subsample 1: Coefficients         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.261  -1.459  -1.359  -1.366  -0.272  -0.393  -0.144 
  [0.153]*  [0.413]***  [0.448]***  [0.436]***  [0.174]  [0.172]**  [0.170] 
Pop. Density    0.131    0.228       
    [0.066]**    [0.118]*       
Urbanization      0.007  -0.149       
      [0.052]  [0.090]*       
Gold              0.073 
              [0.290] 
Iron              0.288 
              [0.424] 
Silver              -0.14 
              [0.189] 
Zinc              0.048 
              [0.310] 
Aver. Temp.            0.078   
            [0.038]**   
Latitude          -0.198     
          [1.470]     
Constant  1.123  5.114  5.287  5.253  1.21  -0.007  0.515 
  [0.714]  [1.687]***  [1.882]***  [1.785]***  [0.962]  [0.899]  [0.815] 
Observations  54  37  37  37  54  54  54 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.04  0.52  0.32  0.59  0.04  0.1  0.11 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 12 
Protestants, Subsample 1: Marginal Effects       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.104  -0.58  -0.534  -0.516  -0.108  -0.157  -0.057 
  [0.061]*  [0.160]***  [0.184]***  [0.162]***  [0.069]  [0.068]**  [0.068] 
Pop. Density    0.052    0.086       
    [0.025]**    [0.035]**       
Gold              0.029 
              [0.115] 
Iron              0.114 
              [0.168] 
Silver              -0.056 
              [0.075] 
Zinc              0.019 
              [0.123] 
Aver. Temp.            0.031   
            [0.015]**   
Latitude          -0.079     
          [0.586]     
Urbanization      0.003  -0.056       
      [0.020]  [0.032]*       
Observations  54  37  37  37  54  54  54 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.04  0.52  0.32  0.59  0.04  0.1  0.11 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 13 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a protestant country. 
Sample restricted to the colonies colonized between 1530 and 1898. 
Protestants, Subsample 2: Coefficients         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.321  -1.382  -1.25  -1.28  -0.346  -0.436  -0.234 
  [0.147]**  [0.423]***  [0.467]***  [0.448]***  [0.166]**  [0.167]***  [0.161] 
Pop. Density    0.116    0.21       
    [0.063]*    [0.117]*       
Urbanization      -0.007  -0.161       
      [0.055]  [0.094]*       
Gold              -0.644 
              [178.647] 
Iron              11.691 
              [2,239.395] 
Silver              1.23 
              [449.655] 
Zinc              -5.486 
              [1,203.411] 
Aver. Temp.            0.067   
            [0.041]   
Latitude          -0.491     
          [1.526]     
Constant  1.507  4.955  5.079  5.132  1.71  0.511  1.124 
  [0.706]**  [1.722]***  [1.967]***  [1.836]***  [0.951]*  [0.916]  [0.801] 
Observations  51  31  31  31  51  51  51 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.07  0.47  0.28  0.56  0.07  0.11  0.21 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 14 
Protestants, Subsample 2: Marginal Effects       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.128  -0.509  -0.496  -0.392  -0.138  -0.174  -0.003 
  [0.058]**  [0.149]***  [0.180]***  [0.179]**  [0.066]**  [0.066]***  [4.221] 
Pop. Density    0.043    0.064       
    [0.019]**    [0.020]***     
Gold              -0.009 
              [10.209] 
Iron              0.159 
              [184.574] 
Silver              0.017 
              [19.604] 
Zinc              -0.075 
              [87.669] 
Aver. Temp.            0.027   
            [0.016]   
Latitude          -0.196     
          [0.609]     
Urbanization      -0.003  -0.049       
      [0.022]  [0.029]*       
Observations  51  31  31  31  51  51  51 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.07  0.47  0.28  0.56  0.07  0.11  0.21 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 15 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a protestant country. 
Sample restricted to the colonies colonized after 1533. 
Protestants, Subsample 3: Coefficients         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.29  -1.356  -1.244  -1.266  -0.311  -0.407  -0.201 
  [0.136]**  [0.423]***  [0.472]***  [0.448]***  [0.152]**  [0.158]**  [0.149] 
Pop. Density    0.098    0.202       
    [0.054]*    [0.118]*       
Urbanization      -0.006  -0.162       
      [0.053]  [0.093]*       
Gold              -0.433 
              [0.000] 
Iron              9.791 
              [3,595.179] 
Silver              2.627 
              [1,662.405] 
Zinc              -5.947 
              [2,847.982] 
Aver. Temp.            0.065   
            [0.040]   
Latitude          -0.439     
          [1.459]     
Constant  1.383  4.92  5.092  5.106  1.556  0.435  0.947 
  [0.666]**  [1.730]***  [1.992]**  [1.840]***  [0.884]*  [0.877]  [0.746] 
Observations  55  30  30  30  55  55  55 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.06  0.45  0.29  0.55  0.06  0.1  0.17 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 16 
Protestants, Subsample 3: Marginal Effects       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.116  -0.502  -0.49  -0.371  -0.124  -0.162  -0.011 
  [0.054]**  [0.148]***  [0.177]***  [0.186]**  [0.061]**  [0.063]***  [17.280] 
Pop. Density    0.036    0.059       
    [0.017]**    [0.019]***     
Gold              -0.023 
              [37.289] 
Iron              0.525 
              [688.488] 
Silver              0.141 
              [201.680] 
Zinc              -0.319 
              [433.364] 
Aver. Temp.            0.026   
            [0.016]   
Latitude          -0.175     
          [0.582]     
Urbanization      -0.002  -0.048       
      [0.021]  [0.027]*       
Observations  55  30  30  30  55  55  55 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.06  0.45  0.29  0.55  0.06  0.1  0.17 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 17 
 Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a common law country. 
Sample restricted to the colonies colonized before 1896. 
Common Law, Subsample 1: Coefficients         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.287  -1.944  -1.953  -1.909  -0.276  -0.379  -0.143 
  [0.155]*  [0.673]***  [0.724]***  [0.706]***  [0.174]  [0.171]**  [0.174] 
Pop. Density    0.006    0.012       
    [0.013]    [0.015]       
Urbanization      -0.027  -0.053       
      [0.061]  [0.071]       
Gold              0.069 
              [0.298] 
Iron              0.294 
              [0.435] 
Silver              -0.14 
              [0.197] 
Zinc              0.067 
              [0.319] 
Aver. Temp.            0.055   
            [0.038]   
Latitude          0.219     
          [1.506]     
Constant  1.088  7.489  7.769  7.622  0.997  0.28  0.319 
  [0.726]  [2.848]***  [3.092]**  [3.003]**  [0.957]  [0.910]  [0.842] 
Observations  50  35  35  35  50  50  50 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.05  0.47  0.47  0.49  0.05  0.08  0.14 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 18 
Common Law, Subsample 1: Marginal Effects       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.112  -0.748  -0.76  -0.734  -0.108  -0.148  -0.057 
  [0.061]*  [0.290]***  [0.311]**  [0.305]**  [0.068]  [0.067]**  [0.069] 
Pop. Density    0.002    0.005       
    [0.005]    [0.006]       
Gold              0.028 
              [0.119] 
Iron              0.117 
              [0.174] 
Silver              -0.056 
              [0.078] 
Zinc              0.027 
              [0.127] 
Aver. Temp.            0.022   
            [0.015]   
Latitude          0.086     
          [0.589]     
Urbanization      -0.01  -0.02       
      [0.024]  [0.027]       
Observations  50  35  35  35  50  50  50 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.05  0.47  0.47  0.49  0.05  0.08  0.14 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 19  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a common law country. 
Sample restricted to the colonies colonized between 1530 and 1896. 
Common Law, Subsample 2: Coefficients         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.337  -1.848  -1.847  -1.814  -0.335  -0.409  -0.225 
  [0.149]**  [0.689]***  [0.755]**  [0.737]**  [0.166]**  [0.166]**  [0.165] 
Pop. Density    0.004    0.011       
    [0.013]    [0.015]       
Urbanization      -0.044  -0.069       
      [0.065]  [0.076]       
Gold              -0.616 
              [170.605] 
Iron              11.313 
              [2,084.356] 
Silver              1.184 
              [420.846] 
Zinc              -5.28 
              [1,121.119] 
Aver. Temp.            0.044   
            [0.041]   
Latitude          0.043     
          [1.561]     
Constant  1.423  7.247  7.591  7.487  1.406  0.771  0.889 
  [0.719]**  [2.909]**  [3.238]**  [3.150]**  [0.945]  [0.934]  [0.827] 
Observations  47  29  29  29  47  47  47 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.08  0.44  0.45  0.46  0.08  0.1  0.23 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 20 
Common Law, Subsample 2: Marginal Effects       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.133  -0.735  -0.731  -0.72  -0.133  -0.162  -0.003 
  [0.059]**  [0.263]***  [0.277]***  [0.277]***  [0.066]**  [0.066]**  [4.452] 
Pop. Density    0.001    0.004       
    [0.005]    [0.006]       
Gold              -0.009 
              [10.814] 
Iron              0.169 
              [197.335] 
Silver              0.018 
              [20.831] 
Zinc              -0.079 
              [93.164] 
Aver. Temp.            0.017   
            [0.016]   
Latitude          0.017     
          [0.617]     
Urbanization      -0.018  -0.028       
      [0.026]  [0.030]       
Observations  47  29  29  29  47  47  47 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.08  0.44  0.45  0.46  0.08  0.1  0.23 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 21  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a common law country. 
Sample restricted to the colonies colonized after 1533 
Common Law, Subsample 3: Coefficients         
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.297  -1.835  -1.827  -1.798  -0.295  -0.376  -0.185 
  [0.138]**  [0.698]***  [0.752]**  [0.736]**  [0.153]*  [0.158]**  [0.152] 
Pop. Density    0.002    0.009       
    [0.013]    [0.016]       
Urbanization      -0.04  -0.061       
      [0.063]  [0.075]       
Gold              -0.411 
              [0.000] 
Iron              9.532 
              [3,395.834] 
Silver              2.544 
              [1,567.478] 
Zinc              -5.762 
              [2,667.827] 
Aver. Temp.            0.044   
            [0.040]   
Latitude          0.048     
          [1.492]     
Constant  1.273  7.25  7.519  7.425  1.255  0.62  0.702 
  [0.677]*  [2.953]**  [3.217]**  [3.141]**  [0.881]  [0.890]  [0.770] 
Observations  51  28  28  28  51  51  51 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.07  0.44  0.45  0.46  0.07  0.09  0.19 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 22 
Common Law, Subsample 3: Marginal Effects       
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Mortality  -0.118  -0.724  -0.716  -0.708  -0.117  -0.149  -0.011 
  [0.055]**  [0.255]***  [0.264]***  [0.265]***  [0.060]*  [0.063]**  [17.566] 
Pop. Density    0.001    0.004       
    [0.005]    [0.006]       
Gold              -0.024 
              [38.941] 
Iron              0.562 
              [742.189] 
Silver              0.15 
              [217.873] 
Zinc              -0.34 
              [465.609] 
Aver. Temp.            0.018   
            [0.016]   
Latitude          0.019     
          [0.591]     
Urbanization      -0.016  -0.024       
      [0.025]  [0.029]       
Observations  51  28  28  28  51  51  51 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.07  0.44  0.45  0.46  0.07  0.09  0.19 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 23 
Multinomial Logit regression: the dependent variable is variable taking value 0 if England was the colonizer, 1 if 
France was the colonizer and 2 if Spain was. 
Multinomial Logit (England omitted): Coefficients     
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Mortality  0.999  6.531  3.82  7.813  1.296  0.577 
(France)  [0.340]***  [1.739]***  [1.769]**  [4.526]*  [0.443]***  [0.356] 
Mortality  0.201  4.996  6.222  6.937  0.139  0.907 
(Spain)  [0.297]  [2.533]***  [2.402]***  [2.708]**  [0.341]  [0.358]** 
Pop. Density    -0.074    -6.445     
(France)    [0.107]    [3.542]*     
Pop. Density    -0.945    -0.466     
(Spain)    [0.474]**    [0.552]     
Urbanization      0.14  1.502     
(France)      [0.146]  [0.753]**     
Urbanization      -0.032  0.764     
(Spain)      [0.100]  [0.578]     
Aver. Temp.            0.075 
(France)            [0.113] 
Aver. Temp.            -0.213 
(Spain)           
Latitude          5.123   
(France)          [3.642]   
Latitude          -1.308   
(Spain)          [2.709]   
Constant  -5.309  -17.277  -15.143  -25.258  -7.759  -6.723 
(France)  [1.697]***  [6.773]**  [7.395]**  [21.745]  [2.699]***  [2.829]** 
Constant  -1.304  -27.326  -28.355  -35.741  -0.785  1.606 
(Spain)  [1.314]  [11.006]**  [10.807]***  [9.889]**  [1.785]  [1.831] 
Observations  56  36  36  36  56  56 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.1  0.62  0.35  0.8  0.13  0.2 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Notice that measures of natural resources have been removed. They were not significant. Table 24 
Multinomial Logit (England omitted): Marginal Effect     
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Mortality  0.16  0.881  0.83  0.502  0.209  0.062 
(France)  [0.052]***  [0.504]*  [0.128]  [0.826]  [0.065]  [0.057]** 
Mortality  -0.027  0.073  0.172  0  -0.057  0.117 
(Spain)  [0.056]  [0.183]  [0.445]*  [0.000]  [0.066]***  [0.067] 
Pop. Density    -0.007    0     
(France)    [0.018]    [0.000]     
Pop. Density    -0.017    -0.03     
(Spain)    [0.037]    [0.070]     
Urbanization      0.006  0     
(France)      [0.005]  [0.094]     
Urbanization      -0.011  0.049     
(Spain)      [0.024]  [0.000]     
Aver. Temp.            0.026 
(France)            [0.016] 
Aver. Temp.            -0.048 
(Spain)           
Latitude          0.949   
(France)          [0.566]*   
Latitude          -0.627   
(Spain)          [0.561]   
Observations  56  36  36  36  56  56 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.1  0.62  0.35  0.8  0.13  0.2 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Notice that measures of natural resources have been removed. They were not significant. 
 Table 25 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was a protestant country. 
Protestants: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 2000  0.134             
  [0.168]             
Constraints on Executive (1960-
2000) 
0.294           
    [0.105]***         
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  0.414         
      [0.135]***       
Schooling 1960            0.146 
              [0.086]* 
Constitutional 
Review 
          -0.048   
            [1.074]   
Judicial 
Independence 
        5.31     
          [1.913]***   
Autocracy 1960-1990      -0.691       
        [0.337]**       
Constant  -1.306  -1.327  -2.876  0.45  -4.329  0.071  -0.523 
  [1.380]  [0.431]***  [0.905]***  [0.335]  [1.781]**  [0.716]  [0.302]* 
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.01  0.11  0.13  0.05  0.52  0  0.05 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 26 
Protestants: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
0.052             
  [0.065]             
Constraints on Executive 
(1960-2000) 
0.114           
    [0.041]***         
Schooling 1960            0.058 
              [0.034]* 
Constitutional 
Review 
          -0.019   
            [0.428]   
Judicial 
Independence 
        1.962     
          [0.509]***   
Autocracy 1960-1990      -0.273       
        [0.133]**       
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  0.164         
      [0.054]***       
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.01  0.11  0.13  0.05  0.52  0  0.05 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 27 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was England. 
England: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
0.258             
  [0.175]             
Constraints on Executive 
(1960-2000) 
0.368           
    [0.110]***         
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  0.385         
      [0.132]***       
Schooling 1960            0.185 
              [0.089]** 
Constitutional 
Review 
          0.799   
            [1.077]   
Judicial 
Independence 
        4.82     
          [1.800]***   
Autocracy 1960-1990      -0.849       
        [0.343]**       
Constant  -2.477  -1.765  -2.819  0.45  -4.039  -0.546  -0.745 
  [1.442]*  [0.462]***  [0.890]***  [0.336]  [1.684]**  [0.717]  [0.312]** 
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.03  0.16  0.12  0.08  0.45  0.01  0.08 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 28 
England: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
0.096             
  [0.065]             
Constraints on Executive 
(1960-2000) 
0.137           
    [0.041]***         
Schooling 1960            0.072 
              [0.035]** 
Constitutional 
Review 
          0.319   
            [0.429]   
Judicial 
Independence 
        1.726     
          [0.451]***   
Autocracy 1960-1990      -0.325       
        [0.132]**       
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  0.148         
      [0.051]***       
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.03  0.16  0.12  0.08  0.45  0.01  0.08 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 29  
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was France. 
France: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
-0.506           
  [0.218]**           
Constraints on Executive 
(1960-2000) 
-0.711         
    [0.223]***       
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  -0.363       
      [0.153]**       
Schooling 1960          -0.832 
            [0.327]** 
Constitutional 
Review 
        -0.821   
          [1.336]   
Autocracy 1960-1990      1.471     
        [0.564]***   
Constant  3.344  1.548  1.595  -2.204  -0.801  0.443 
  [1.720]*  [0.659]**  [0.969]*  [0.636]***  [0.855]  [0.482] 
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.1  0.28  0.09  0.15  0.02  0.33 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Note: judicial independence perfectly predicts failure below 0.33 
 Table 30. 
France: Marginal Effects         
  I  II  III  IV  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
-0.148           
  [0.060]**           




       
    [0.036]***       
Schooling 1960          -0.046 
            [0.041] 
Constitutional 
Review 
        -0.137   
          [0.222]   
Autocracy 1960-1990      0.38     
        [0.124]***   
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  -0.105       
      [0.042]**       
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.1  0.28  0.09  0.15  0.02  0.33 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Note: judicial independence perfectly predicts failure below 0.33 
 Table 31 
Probit regression: the dependent variable is dummy indicating whether the colonizer was Spain. 
Spain: Coefficients           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
0.31             
  [0.186]*             
Constraints on Executive 
(1960-2000) 
0.136           
    [0.102]           
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  -0.09         
      [0.130]         
Schooling 1960            0.052 
              [0.080] 
Constitutional 
Review 
          0.616   
            [1.217]   
Judicial 
Independence 
        -1.381     
          [0.692]**     
Autocracy 1960-1990      -0.375       
        [0.352]       
Constant  -3.085  -1.156  -0.075  -0.325  0.515  -0.855  -0.586 
  [1.562]**  [0.444]***  [0.863]  [0.336]  [0.537]  [0.821]  [0.309]* 
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.04  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.1  0.01  0.01 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 Table 32 
Spain: Marginal Effects           
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
GDP per capita 
2000 
0.106             
  [0.063]*             
Constraints on Executive 
(1960-2000) 
0.044           
    [0.033]           
Schooling 1960            0.019 
              [0.029] 
Constitutional 
Review 
          0.221   
            [0.435]   
Judicial 
Independence 
        -0.484     
          [0.241]**     
Autocracy 1960-1990      -0.121       
        [0.113]       
Risk of Expropriation (1982-1987)  -0.029         
      [0.041]         
Observations  53  60  63  61  31  31  48 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.04  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.1  0.01  0.01 
Standard errors in brackets           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 